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December 16, 2002 
At first inspection, the Bush administration's new "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction," released to the public on 11 December 2002 [1], reads like old wine in a new bottle—
certainly not the "fundamental change from the past" claimed by its authors. The assertion that "weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical—in the possession of hostile states and 
terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States," has become one of 
the more common claims heard in Washington. But words are words and deeds are deeds, Bush 
administration officials keep telling us. Thus it is particularly surprising that the three pillars of the Bush 
strategy—counterproliferation to combat WMD use, enhanced nonproliferation to combat WMD 
proliferation, and consequence management to respond to WMD use—were central elements of the 
previous administration's policy on WMD. In fact, these policy components came together early in 
President Clinton's first term. On closer examination, however, there is much in the Bush strategy that 
truly is new, much that stands out as an improvement over previous U.S. approaches to WMD, and much 
that already is being implemented with some success. 
Rethinking the WMD Threat 
The U.S. government has been concerned about the proliferation and use of WMD since chemical 
warfare agents were used against American troops in the First World War and U.S. adversaries started to 
develop biological warfare agents and nuclear weapons during and after the Second World War. While 
WMD were viewed during and immediately after the cold war as weapons of last resort, the Bush strategy 
correctly observes that WMD are now "militarily useful weapons of choice intended to overcome our 
nation's advantages in conventional forces and to deter us form responding to aggression against our 
friends and allies in regions of vital interest." "In addition," the new strategy asserts, "terrorist groups are 
seeking to acquire WMD with the stated purpose of killing large numbers of our people and those of our 
friends and allies—without compunction and without warning." 
While these words could have been written by former Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, who said 
that "our unrivaled supremacy in the conventional military arena is prompting adversaries to seek 
unconventional, asymmetric means to strike what they perceived as our Achilles heel," and that among 
our adversaries, we especially must be prepared to counter "fanatical terrorists" armed with WMD [2], 
there is a clear sense of urgency in the Bush administration's statements about WMD, which did not exist 
before 11 September 2001. Just as the American people viewed the Japanese threat in a new light after 
the attack on Pear Harbor, so too does the public and its elected officials see a palpable change in the 
threat posed by state and non-state owners of WMD after last year's terrorist attacks against New York 
and Washington. As stated in this administration's National Security Strategy, released in September 
2002, "the inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of 
potential harm" all contribute to a clear and present danger.[3]  
Of course, the urgency associated with today's WMD threat may result from more than just a changed 
national culture based on a heightened sense of vulnerability. The president's WMD strategy may be 
motivated, at least in part, by new intelligence on deadly state and non-state WMD programs starting up, 
existing WMD programs reaching new technological or military milestones, and dangerous WMD 
transfers taking place by land, air, sea, and even by the internet. The 10 December interdiction of a North 
Korean ship laden with Scud missiles for Yemen, satellite imagery appearing the same week of new 
nuclear sites being constructed in Iran, recent revelations about North Korean advances in plutonium and 
enriched uranium production, and continued allegations about ongoing Iraqi WMD programs, all suggest 
that the WMD threat may be growing much faster than the public can see. 
Counterproliferation 
The first pillar of the new WMD strategy—counterproliferation to combat WMD use—had never before 
received presidential attention; but it is a policy that the Department of Defense (DoD) has been carrying 
out for over nine years. Counterproliferation refers to the full range of military preparations and activities 
to deter, defeat, and defend against the threat posed by WMD-armed adversaries. The three key 
elements of the Bush administration's counterproliferation strategy—deterrence, interdiction, and defense 
and mitigation—were top DoD priorities in the last administration, but they have a much different standing 
today. 
The new U.S. deterrence posture against WMD use still rests on a strong declaratory policy and effective 
military forces, but there has been a not-so-subtle shift in the balance of deterrence from long-standing 
promises to punish any adversary that contemplated WMD use against U.S. interests, to increasingly 
credible threats to deny adversaries any meaningful political or military advantage from using WMD. The 
Bush administration remains adamant about the U.S. government's "right to respond with overwhelming 
force—including through resort to all of our options—to the use of WMD against the United States, its 
forces abroad, and friends and allies." In addition, the new strategy calls for improved military and civilian 
capabilities to defeat and defend against WMD use—including missile defenses and force enhancements 
such as intelligence, surveillance, interdiction, and even domestic law enforcement—which combine to 
strengthen deterrence by "devaluing an adversary's WMD and missiles." 
Recognizing that deterrence may not succeed, and that WMD employment against the U.S. population or 
military forces could be devastating, the new strategy requires U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian 
agencies to be prepared to "detect and destroy an adversary's WMD assets before these weapons are 
used" and to have in place "robust active and passive defenses and mitigation measures" to enable U.S. 
authorities to accomplish their missions, and to assist friends and allies when WMD are used. Once again, 
this approach has much in common with previous U.S. policies, but the stress placed on missile defenses, 
and the unprecedented resources devoted to them, is a hallmark of the Bush administration's defense 
strategy. Also receiving new and appropriate emphasis is the development of specifically tailored policies 
to counter biological weapons, which, because of their unique detection and response requirements, 
cannot be lumped together with chemical weapons. 
The most dramatic innovation in counterproliferation policy is the new stress on interdiction. The Bush 
administration is dead serious about enhancing "the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and 
law enforcement communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to 
hostile states and terrorist organizations." The recent seizure of a North Korean ship carrying Scud 
missiles bound for Yemen is evidence of this new approach. Because the missiles were going to a close 
ally in the war on terrorism, the shipment was allowed to sail on to Yemen, but the outcome would have 
been different had the ultimate recipient been a U.S. adversary, such as Iraq, or a stateless terrorist 
group, such as Al Qaeda. Of course, there is more to the new interdiction strategy than has been made 
public. U.S. intelligence agencies and military planners now have explicit guidance and top-level support 
to prevent WMD from moving to regions of vital interest.  
Nonproliferation 
The Bush administration's nonproliferation diplomacy has been the most widely challenged element of the 
new WMD strategy. Perhaps because of the stinging criticism the government has received for 
suspending multilateral negotiations on the compliance and transparency protocol of the thirty-year old 
Biological and Toxin Weapon convention, slashing funding for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs 
designed to reduce the danger of Soviet legacy WMD, and accepting India and Pakistan as nuclear 
weapon states despite their refusal to honor the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (which they did not sign), 
the new WMD strategy promises to "actively employ diplomatic approaches in bilateral and multilateral 
settings in pursuit of our nonproliferation goals." Although the NGO community is skeptical of this claim, 
administration officials are counting on the enhanced counterproliferation and consequence management 
measures to provide an international environment more conducive to meaningful nonproliferation 
diplomacy than has been the case in recent years. 
WMD Consequence Management 
The third pillar of the new WMD strategy is a heightened readiness to respond to the consequences of 
WMD use against the American homeland or U.S. forces deployed abroad, and to assist friends and 
allies if they come under WMD attack. As with the other strategic pillars, this approach is familiar. 
President Clinton made homeland security a top priority of his second administration. But in the aftermath 
of the 11 September attacks, President Bush has gone several steps further. The new National Strategy 
for Homeland Security calls for greater preparedness to prevent, protect against, and respond to acts of 
terrorism on American soil [4], and the planned Department of Homeland Security will have 
unprecedented resources and responsibilities to mitigate the consequences of WMD use. Evidence that 
this policy is producing real change in the way we treat WMD risks at home is the government's recent 
directive to vaccinate civilian health care workers and military personnel against the infectious biological 
agent smallpox, and to make the vaccine available to the American public as early as next year. 
A National Strategy: Long Overdue 
While there are many truly new features in the government's new WMD policy, the most innovative aspect 
of the President's strategy on WMD is that it is a Presidential strategy on WMD. Whereas in previous 
administrations, the State Department pursued nonproliferation and the Defense Department pursued 
counterproliferation, and domestic authorities planned for homeland security, today these elements are 
woven together in a coherent White House strategy. "What's new here is that we have a comprehensive 
strategy," a senior administration official said during a White House background briefing. "Every 
administration comes under criticism for not having an integrated strategy on issues like this. We do." The 
impact of President's weight behind this strategy cannot be overestimated. Because there was no 
national strategy in the past, much-needed funds were not released to counterproliferation programs, 
intelligence agencies were not made to work together to anticipate WMD threats, military services were 
not forced to fully organize, train and equip to counter WMD use, and domestic agencies were not made 
aware of the imminence of WMD threats to the homeland. If backed by real resources and the President's 
full support, the new "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction" will make us believe 
that NBC no longer stands for "no-body cares." 
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